

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**ARMY NATIONAL GUARD READINESS: TRANSFORMING TO MEET THE
CHALLENGES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY**

by

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ABSTRACT

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As the United States entered the twenty-first century, many issues relating to national security were unresolved, yet to many Americans, the major security concern or threat for the turn of the new century revolved around a topic commonly referred to as the Y2K concern. Nineteen months and eleven days later, our new century brought in a not new but rather a different threat, which has and continues to transform our people, our way of life and our national security strategies and policies. The events of September 11, 2001 embarked this nation on a War on Terrorism which is redefining our National Security Strategy and which has many organizations and agencies within the Department of Defense rethinking their strategies as to how to transform in order to better meet the national strategy objectives. The Army National Guard of the United States is one such organization, which will need to transform in order to remain America's strategic reserve and remain a relevant, affordable, and accessible force. Therefore, Army National Guard readiness is not only essential but also critical to achieving the highest priority of the U.S. military, which is to defend the nation from all enemies.

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ARMY NATIONAL GUARD READINESS: TRANSFORMING TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

As the United States military entered the twenty-first century, many issues relating to national security were unresolved, yet to many Americans, the major security concern or threat for the turn of the new century revolved around a topic commonly referred to as the Y2K concern. Y2K came with minimal distractions but at a considerable cost for preparation. Nineteen months and eleven days later, the new century brought in a different threat, terrorism, which has and continues to *transform* our people, our way of life and our national security strategies and policies.

The events of September 11, 2001 were certainly horrific for the acts, deaths and destruction involved. The nation suffered a major attack on its home soil for the first time since December 7, 1941. A point of interest is that on Feb 26, 1993, a bomb exploded in the garage of the World Trade Center, killing six and injuring many. The Joint Terrorism Task Force was able to solve the case and the individuals responsible were apprehended and sentenced. The success of the case helped to dispel the sense of vulnerability which terrorists had hoped to instill¹. But the enemy on September 11, was different, it did not represent a nation-state, nor did it fight in a symmetrical manner. International terrorism in its worst and ugly fashion, had struck America and targeted the very symbols of elements of our national power. Thus by the very nature of the attack, September 11 was a key catalyst for change and transformation in our way of thinking of the United States' national security strategy.

This one day's event in American history sent a nation into many forms of transformation. Since then, our nation has evolved with a new Department of Homeland Security, and adopted the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act. Militarily, the Department of Defense, created another unified command in Northern Command (NORTHCOM), conducted Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle, conducted combat operations and regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq. For the foreseeable future, will continue to fight the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

The transformation theme helped to enhance the nation's military thinking as well. President Bush at the signing of the FY 02 Defense Appropriations Bill on 10 January 2002 stated, "This nation must have ready forces that can bring victory to our country, and safety to our people... My administration is committed to *transforming* our forces, with *innovative* doctrine, strategy and weaponry. This will allow us to *revolutionize* the battle field of the future and keep the peace by defining war on our terms... We will build the security of America by

fighting our enemies abroad, and protecting our folks here at home. And we are committed ... to these most important goals.¹²

Transformation has become a buzzword throughout the United States Army. In 1999, The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, propelled the Army into a new era, which would integrate the Army as an equal partner as part of the joint team in joint operations to an extent heretofore unseen. This element supported the Army Vision, and consisted of three main themes: *People, Readiness, and Transformation*.³

This Army Vision seemed quite simple, and once the controversy over the beret policy were resolved, the discussions began to focus on what transformation encompasses, and what were its implications, and impact. General Shinseki's views of transformation focused around the concept of how we would fight and win the nation's future wars. This concept included the system, which would move us from a Legacy Force, to an Interim Force, to the endstate - Objective Force.⁴ Recently, this concept has undergone another change in terminology from the new Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter J. Schoomaker. The new phrases, while different in terminology, support a similar endstate and are referred to as the Current Force, Stryker Force, and Future Force. The Army vision not only looks at future concepts but it is also shaping how we operate in the present, including the GWOT.

US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is helping or pushing us to redefine our national security strategy. It is making organizations and agencies within the Department of Defense (DoD) rethink their strategies as to how to transform in order to better meet the national military objectives. The Army National Guard is one such organization, which will need to transform in order to fulfill its purpose as America's strategic reserve force. Due to ongoing requirements, the Army National Guard *readiness* is not only essential but critical to achieving the strategic security objectives of the U.S. military which is to defend the Nation from all enemies.

Our national security strategy provides a frame work of ends, ways and means which allow for its execution. Our nation emphasizes certain core *values* for democracy as components of the National Security Strategy. These include the principles of political and economic freedom; respect for human dignity; and peaceful relations with other nations⁵. Its ends for this concept include: *Defend the peace, Preserve the peace, and Extend the peace*.

It seeks to accomplish these through three concepts: *Defend: Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism, Prevent threats from weapons of mass destruction, and Defuse regional*

conflicts. Preserve: Cooperative action with other powers. Extend: Champion human dignity, Global economic growth, and Expand circle of development.⁶

It attains these through the resources of national elements of power, with the underlining theme of readiness and transformation. This is accomplished through: *Military, Intelligence, Diplomacy, and Public information.*

From our National Security Strategy, we can then assess our current national military strategy (NMS) which can be found in the pre-decisional draft of 16 October 2002 or the September 30, 2001, Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report. The QDR shapes our total force strategy to:

- Defend the United States.
- Deter aggression and coercion forward in four critical regions.
- Swiftly defeat two efforts or aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts – including the possibility of regime change or occupation.
- Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale-contingency operations.
- Fight the Global War on Terrorism.⁷

This total force strategy can serve as a tool for the Army National Guard to further define its strategies and transformation for its continuing historical role in the defense of the nation.

KEY ROLE OF THE GUARD

The National Guard is considered to be the bridge between national security policy and the will of the people. For this reason, the militia based defense concept, upon which the nation was founded, enabled the acceptance of the Laird Total Force Policy and the Abrams Doctrine. The latter holds that we should never go to war without the involvement of the Guard and Reserve, because they bring the national will of the people to the fight.⁸

During the cold war era, the National Guard, was trained and held in reserve as the major combat reserve force for low-probability / high intensity conflicts. Since the cold war, it has been increasingly used in high-probability / low-intensity contingencies such as humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, and to relieve active component operations tempo.⁹ The National Guard has seen an increase in deployments, serving and supporting Panama, the Gulf War, Los Angeles Riots, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Southwest Asia, Kosovo, Sinai, Afghanistan, Iraq again, and the present Homeland Defense and War on Terrorism.

The Army National Guard functions are unique due to its dual missions to the state and federal governments and the fact that it can serve under the command of the state governors

or President of the United States. The National's Guard's charter is the Constitution of the United States. Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S Constitution contains clauses which vests distinct authority and responsibilities for the federal and state governments.¹⁰

The Army National Guard possesses 3300 armories across 2700 communities, comprising of 1800 units and 350,000 + soldiers. At the end FY O2, the Army composition was complimented from the Army National Guard by 56% of combat, 40% combat support, and 34% combat service support. The Guard comprised 34% of the Army force structure.¹¹ The Army National Guard, supporting the joint operational concepts, is a full partner in rapid strategic mobility, with tailor-to-task organizational flexibility, and ultimately, a key component in a seamless joint force that can be committed cross-dimensionally along the entire spectrum of contingencies. Thus the Army National Guard is tailored as a full spectrum force to uphold its federal and state missions by supporting major theatres of war, small scale contingencies, domestic terrorism, homeland security, information operations, emergency response missions and national missile defense.

The Army National Guard's Vision 2010 envision the Guard as "A relevant force...missioned across the spectrum of contingencies...structured and resourced to accomplish its missions...capable and accessible when called...with trained citizen-soldiers committed to preserving the timeless traditions and values of service to our nation and communities. This statement aligns the Army National Guard's vision, priorities and goals toward building a twenty-first century full-spectrum joint team".¹²

CHALLENGES FOR TRANSFORMATION

This do all – be all reads very well but can it be sustained? This is the question which must be answered and why the Army National Guard must transform its readiness capabilities for the challenges of the twenty-first century. Few question the strength and force enabler which the Army National Guard brings to the Army and U.S. forces. Currently, DoD is undertaking a comprehensive review of the Active and Reserve mix, organization, priority missions, and associated resources. To this end, the Army National Guard needs to take the initiative in order to help redefine its role as an integral part of America's Army.

Transformation should be applied to all facets of operations to include processes, cultural ways of doing business, and revising our goals, and strategies. It should also create an environment, which supports the muddy boots soldier and the innovative intellectual professional. Moreover, we should open the dialogue to the full spectrum of how we operate

and do business, as a military organization. Transformation should be open and studied in all areas of Army operations. This certainly should be the case in the Army National Guard.

This need for military change was underscored by the President's remarks at last year's graduation exercise for the United States Military Academy, where he stated, "For much of the last century, America's defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply. *But new threats also require new thinking*".¹³

COURSES OF ACTION

Currently, some 330, 000 of the 1.04 million soldiers in the Army are deployed away from home and family in 120 countries around the world...more than 130,000 Guard and Reserve soldiers are deployed.¹⁴ Since the 2001 attacks, the National Guard has mobilized almost 210,000 of its 350,000 soldiers at one time or another, serving in 82 countries around the world. These numbers will not likely subside in the foreseeable future. The Pentagon recently announced that it will be calling for an additional 43,000 Guard and Reserve combat-support troops. These numbers include three National Guard combat brigades.¹⁵ Taking these numbers into consideration, it is easy to see how relevant and critical the focus of mobilization must remain in order to continue to successfully execute the GWOT.

The GWOT is testing the current policies for the categories of mobilization. Selective, Partial, Full, and Total Mobilization provide our leadership the mechanism for Guard and Reserve call-ups. The current Partial Mobilization enables for the "Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full Mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000 to not more than 24 consecutive months) to mobilize the Ready Reserve Component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security."¹⁶

Department of the Army strategies for mobilization of the Army National Guard are based much on the readiness posture of units. United States Forces Command serves as the primary command responsible for training, mobilizing, and deploying combat ready Reserve Component forces for contingency operations. It is responsible for executing actions necessary to provide the forces and resources to meet requirements of the combatant commanders.¹⁷ National Guard units are evaluated for mobilization readiness in large part through the Unit Status Reports (USR).

Guard units report USRs through the National Guard Bureau (NGB) when not on active duty. The USR measures four areas: Personnel, equipment-on-hand, equipment readiness, and the training. These four areas serve as a solid foundation for the measurement of a unit's capabilities and readiness posture for mobilization. However, it is the lack of resourcing of this reporting mechanism, which prohibits Guard units from properly being able to mobilize in a timely manner, an issue of debate among both political and military leaders.

The debate over the process of transformation should not be necessarily about what should be the key mission(s) of the National Guard, but rather about changing how we prepare and resource Guard readiness for mobilization. This action is long overdue. By virtue of its optempo and employment in current conflicts, the Army National Guard understands the intent and need for transformation. So the question to be answered is, what courses of action (COA) should be taken in order to enhance Guard readiness and meet the challenges of the twenty-first century? To answer this question, there are many options available, which will support the national military strategy for defending the nation against all enemies. Limiting the COAs to the best possibilities, there are three distinct COAs that will enhance readiness and improve Guard mobilization capabilities. These COAs will support combatant commanders needs for real time units with real timeline mobilization and deployment operations. The three COAs include: 1) Enhancing Medical Readiness for Personnel; 2) Re-balancing the Force-mix and; 3) Establishing a Deployment Predictability Model.

ENHANCING MEDICAL READINESS:

Due to the increase in optempo and deployments lasting up to two years, and the decreased time periods from alert to mobilization and deployment, it is imperative for individual soldier readiness to remain high. While this includes individual training, military occupational skills qualification, family readiness, it also involves a more critical area often overlooked until mobilization; that is the area of medical readiness.

This area of medical readiness has complicated current policy. For the traditional Guard member, medical physicals are conducted every five years, unless the soldier is over 40 years of age. In certain priority units, physicals are given every two years. Regrettably, during this important cycle, other areas of medical readiness are overlooked. Two critical areas include immunization and dental examinations. It is difficult for unit level commanders to know the medical conditions of their soldiers during a period which could span a five-year window. Consequently, units upon alert and mobilization require additional days to complete soldier

readiness processing (SRP) and medical evaluations, which take away from the critical post-mobilization tasks.

A recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report stated “that more than 20% of Guardsmen and Reservists don’t have any health coverage, and that about 40% of junior enlisted personnel lack health coverage. The Army has consistently missed statutory requirements for monitoring the health and dental status of early-deploying reservists. Without adequate examinations, the Army may be training, supporting and mobilizing Guardsmen and Reservists who are unfit for duty.”¹⁸ Table 1, depicts the current status of medical readiness by components. This table indicates the need for more focus and attention to be given to medical readiness, if timeframes for deployments are to be shortened.

COMPO ASG	COMPO 1 (active) 487606	COMPO 2 (Guard) 344876	COMPO 3 (Res) 326631	TPU 208848	IRR 117783
Dental Class 1/2 NO GO 1/2	430909 88.37% 56697 11.63%	165578 48.01% 179298 51.99%	120764 36.97% 205867 63.03%	107218 51.34% 101630 48.66%	13546 11.50% 104237 88.50%
GO Immunizations NO GO Immunizations	184993 37.94% 302613 62.06%	93630 27.15% 251246 72.85%	70587 21.61% 256044 78.39%	56449 27.03% 152399 72.97%	14138 12.00% 103645 88.00%
GO Medical Readiness Labs	167775 34.41%	183293 53.15%	69717 21.34%	55626 26.63%	14091 11.96%
NO GO Labs	319831 65.59%	161583 46.85%	256914 78.66%	153222 73.37%	103692 88.04%
NO Deployment Limiting Cond NO GO Depl Limiting Cond	472960 97.00% 14646 3.00%	331853 96.22% 13023 3.78%	319821 97.92% 6810 2.08%	204030 97.69% 4818 2.31%	115791 98.31% 1992 1.69%
GO Health Assessment NO GO Health Assessment	366051 75.07% 121555 24.93%	323046 93.67% 21830 6.33%	149672 45.82% 176959 54.18%	108496 51.95% 100352 48.05%	41176 34.96% 76607 65.04%
GO Medical Equipment NO GO Medical Equipment	93872 19.25% 393734 80.75%	75673 21.94% 269203 78.06%	23156 7.09% 303475 92.91%	16962 8.12% 191886 91.88%	6194 5.26% 111589 94.74%
GO 5 of 6 Criteria NO GO	35087 7.20% 452519 92.80%	23120 6.70% 321756 93.30%	6710 2.05% 319921 97.95%	5429 2.60% 203419 97.40%	1281 1.09% 116502 98.91%

TABLE 1¹⁹

This report reinforced the contention of some congressional and Guard leaders’ that TRICARE medical coverage should be expanded to Guardsmen and Reservists. After a third attempt, to extend medical benefits, on October 29th, 2003, congressional conferees agreed to include as part of the \$87 billion Iraq / Afghanistan supplemental bill to provide health care coverage to Guard and Reserve personnel on a cost-share basis. The plan also authorizes Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to allow Guard and Reserve personnel to complete full

medical screenings upon receipt of notification for alert orders, not upon activation, as was the previous practice, thus saving time in an already cumbersome mobilization process.²⁰

The TRICARE issue was heavily debated within DoD, National Guard Association, and Congress. Senator Patrick Leahy, (D-VT), co-chairman of the Senate national Guard caucus stated "Today, Guardsmen and Reservists, are serving frontline duty in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, but we still only give our Guard and Reserves and their families rear-guard health insurance coverage....This is a giant step forward for fairness for them and their families, and it's a big step forward for our military readiness."²¹

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, an opponent of this expansion in benefits , stated "The proposal to expand TRICARE could cost as much as \$5.1 billion per year. These unfunded entitlements would drain resources from important programs benefiting our military, such as continued improvements in pay, quality of life, readiness, and other pressing requirements."²²

For the Bush administration, the \$87 billion supplemental bill was more important, and the bill, extending benefits and supplementing Operation Iraqi Freedom, was finally signed after a considerable lobbying effort. Though this change is not a complete 100% coverage, it is a start and it will enhance the readiness and mobilization process for soldiers upon arrival at the mobilization station. It is also a strong benefit for quality of life and should positively impact recruiting and retention efforts.

REBALANCING THE FORCE-MIX:

The Army National Guard, supporting the joint operational concepts, is a full partner in rapid strategic mobility, tailor-to-task organizational flexibility, and ultimately, a key component in a seamless joint force that can be committed cross-dimensionally along the entire spectrum of contingencies. At the end FY O2, the Army composition was complimented from the Army National Guard by 56% of combat, 40% combat support, and 34% combat service support. The Guard comprised 34% of the Army force structure.²³ Thus, the Army National Guard is tailored as a full spectrum force to uphold its federal and state missions by supporting major theatres of war, small scale contingencies, domestic terrorism, homeland security, information operations, emergency response missions and national missile defense.

Again, few question the strength and force enablers, which the Army National Guard brings to the Army and U.S. forces. However, GWOT is putting a stress on U.S. forces, which in turn, is putting a stress on the Guard and Reserve components as a whole. The foreseeable future shows no relaxing in military optempo. Figure 1, depicts the increase of Reserve

component usage by man-days for missions and underscores the need for better force management.




FIGURE 1 RESERVE COMPONENT SUPPORT TO TOTAL FORCE MISSIONS²⁴

Civilian and military leaders through their messages have indicated the same. The CSA, Gen. Schoomaker, in a recent address to the National Guard Association of the United States stated, "It's inescapable that the Reserve component will have an increasingly important role in terms of what we will be doing and that our relationship is going to have to be increasingly more seamless... we're going to have to factor Reserve components into the rotation base".²⁵

In a July 9, 2003 memo, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, directed the services to re-look and re-balance the active and reserve mix. This is due in large part to concerns of go-to-war specialties found primarily in the Guard and Reserve. His guidance also included eliminating the need for involuntary use of the Guard and Reserve in the first 15-days of rapid-response operations.²⁶

Re-balancing the force-mix is feasible and achievable. It can assist in the alignment structure with end-strength and build each component with the right mix of units and specialties. Certain skills and assets are required in the early timed phases of mobilization and deployments and should perhaps be more situated in the active component for expeditionary deployment response. Military occupational skills such as transportation, civil affairs, and military police will allow for this plan to be widely accepted. These types of skills are heavily relied upon during the initial and pre-mobilization periods and phase four reconstruction stages of contingency

operations. Recent numbers do indicate that certain career fields within the Reserve component are being stressed by the recent mobilizations.

Within the Officer ranks, reserve Civil Affairs that make up 72% of the force has undergone a 56% call up. Military police make up 45% of the force and have activated 51% of its force. Military intelligence, which makes up 37% of the force, has activated 48% of its force. The picture is similar in the enlisted ranks. Installation security specialty makes up 30% of the force and has activated 86% of its force. Law enforcement makes up 44% of the force and activated 69% of its force. Special forces, which make up 24% of the force has activated 65% of its force. And, air crews which make up 25% of the force have activated 67% of its force. These are just some of the stressed occupational skills.²⁷ Low density skills such as military historians are beginning to feel the same stress and impact.

To this end, force-mix changes are already underway. The Army, beginning in 2001, reprogrammed 30,000 spaces in the active and reserve components. The National Guard is heavily involved in this initiative, which accelerated the conversion of some 2000 spaces. These spaces are from units which are being cross-trained from National Guard Field Artillery batteries in order to conduct security, law and order missions. This initiative enables the creation of 15 new provisional Military Police companies, and the total could rise to 18 in FY04.²⁸ The Army National Guard force structure has 89 field artillery battalions and is easily able to accommodate this initiative. This is an excellent alternative to utilizing units, which are currently not being utilized.

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, LTG H. Steven Blum is currently evaluating the July 9, SECDEF's memo directive and has taken steps to further enhance readiness and transform the Guard by providing guidance to each of the 54 states and territories to transform their State Area Commands (STARC) to Joint Force Headquarters.²⁹

The creation of the Joint Force Headquarters at the state levels allows Army and Air National Guard to share resources more readily without the cumbersome concerns for requests through separate headquarters. The Air National Guard readily conducts Operational Readiness Exercises and their expertise can lend to Army units in their Mobilization Readiness Assessments (MRA). This concept reinforces joint doctrine training.

Reviewing and initiating the re-balancing of force-mix is a positive move for the Army and DoD. The Army National Guard, however, must maintain sufficient combat skill forces with the capability to remain and serve as America's strategic reserve force, a policy that has been in effect since the Dick Act of 1903. The Act, providing for pay, equipment and training, replaced

the 1792 Militia Act and affirmed the National Guard as the nation's primary organized reserve force.³⁰

PREDICTABILITY FORCE SUPPORT PACKAGE MODEL:

The issue for predictable use of reserve forces is created by the capabilities of civilian personnel to transform from citizen and civilian worker to full-time soldier. Citizen soldiers are primed for call-ups by a state governor for a state emergency, which may last a number of days. Employers and families of guardsmen, understand this, and may very well be hampered by the same state emergency. It is a different scenario, however, to be told to report within a matter of days to a homestation armory for mobilization which due to these unpredictable times and GWOT, may last up to one year. This short notification impacts the employer and the family.

The DoD establishment must understand the impact this has on employers and communities throughout this great land when there is no predictability to unit mobilizations belonging to the Guard and Reserve components. In some cases, it creates a huge burden when the mobilized Guardsmen serve as their own business owner or as a community's first responder. Guard and Reserve members do not shy away from their responsibilities as citizen-soldiers. This nation was founded on the militia concept and the legacy of the Minuteman is a proud and strong lineage. However, in an era where *pre-emptive strategy* is relevant, it puts the Guard, today's militia, in a very unpredictable and difficult situation for the long term. Therefore, units must be able to receive the appropriate predictability guidance in order to train, alert and deploy. This predictability concept will ease the process and put more of the certification for the unit's readiness on the commanders and Adjutant Generals of each state. The Guard should not continue to be put in positions that require units to deploy in less than 30 days after alert, or be given notification only to see the alert never transpire. This need for improvement was demonstrated in a 2003 Reserve Component Status of Forces Survey. This survey identified personnel receiving advance notice of mobilization as 16 percent in 24 hours or less; 49 percent in 1-7 days, 12 percent in 1-2 weeks, 7 percent in 2-4 weeks, 16 percent in more than 1 month. The DoD goal for advance notice of mobilization is 30 days.³¹

Currently, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), CSA, and CNGB, each support some type of predictability model for mobilization. Thus, such a model should strive to achieve some essence of predictability. However, as evidenced by the most recent alerts for Guardsmen in 2005, the leadership's definition of predictability revolves around advance notice, that gives alerted units more preparation time for mobilization. But, predictability should go further than just advance notice.

Creating a Predictability Force Support Package (FSP) Model that will enable the Army National Guard to manage its forces in determining when a unit deploys is needed in today's uncertain world situations. The Office of the Directorate of the Army National Guard is looking at such a model which in summary replaces the red, amber, green training management cycle found in the Army Field Manual 25-101, Battle Focused Training. This concept also provides opportunities to *train, alert and deploy* units, which is a change from past practice, when Army National Guard units trained, alerted, conducted post-mobilization training, and then deployed.³²

Current guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense states that reserve units should not deploy more than once every six years. The predictability model can create an FSP cycle to support this one-in-six guidance. This will enable the units to manage and train their units to the capabilities based on their known mission for that particular year's guidance. For example, for FSP Year One, the units would focus their resources on individual skills, Military Occupational Specialty (MOSQ) training, schools training, recruiting, *medical readiness* and state requirements, and conduct year round annual training. FSP Year Two would be similar to FSP Year One and the addition for Homeland Security / Defense training. FSP Year Three the unit conducts the traditional annual training of 15 days. It would include collective level and platoon level operations. FSP Year Four continues collective level training and moves to company and battalion level training, with initial planning for Year 5, which includes training for follow-on oversea deployment in support of small-scale operations, peacekeeping and other contingency operations. FSP Year Five includes certifications for deployment through combat training centers and national training centers, preparation for deployment. FSP Year Six is execution of deployment operations and units available for immediate contingency operations and national emergencies. The cycle concludes with redeployment and the regeneration of the unit into FSP Year One again.

CONCLUSION:

Each of the three COA initiatives for readiness and mobilization improvement is executable. However, the transformation process will only be successful if properly resourced. The cost for the expanded TRICARE has been estimated at \$5.1 billion annually. The dividend, however, of having a more medically ready force, far outweighs the cost. In fact, from the Army's FY 03 budget of \$91 billion, the Army National Guard's cost is 11%. This is a tremendous cost benefit considering the Army National Guard force structure is 38% of the Army force structure.³³

The re-balancing of the force mix is an executable and manageable task. If the Army can transform from a Current Force, to a Stryker Force, to a Future Force, fighting two contingencies, plus the War on Terrorism, it can certainly move and trades spaces, equipment and endstrength. This action will provide for a structurally balanced force across the spectrum readily available to accomplish any and all missions as necessary.

The need for a predictability mobilization model is paramount for our stable economy. Not providing for a reasonable degree of predictability creates potential risks, which should be avoided and could jeopardize the Army National Guard in three major areas, as well as, second and third order effects. First, the Soldier not having a predictable operational tempo might deter his retention options. This could easily transpire to the recruitment area, since much of the Guard's recruiting effort is by word of mouth or the buddy system. The second would be the adverse impact from the Soldier's family. Without support of the family, negative recruiting and retention could occur. Thirdly, support from the Employer Support of the Guard Reserve (ESGR) might be impacted negatively and a huge base of support could be lost.

Based on the latest QDR Report which lends to the total force in supporting a 1-4-2-1 defense strategy; it would be a logical recommendation that as a part of the Army Vision and the theme of *Transformation*, that all efforts to improve the readiness and mobilization process be reviewed, analyzed and implemented with regards to the Army National Guard. Thus, providing the effort and resourcing to *medical readiness, balancing the force mix and establishing a Predictable Force Support Package Model* will enhance Guard readiness and their mobilization capabilities.

The Army National Guard's Vision 2010 envision the Guard as "A relevant force...missioned across the spectrum of contingencies...structured and resource to accomplish its missions...capable and accessible when called...with trained citizen-soldiers committed to preserving the timeless traditions and values of service to our nation and communities. This statement aligns the Army National Guard's vision, priorities and goals toward building a twenty-first century full-spectrum joint team."³⁴

The Army National Guard has a strong and proud heritage. Our nation was founded on the concept of the militia and the minuteman. For over 367 years, it has stood proud in service to the nation. Our leaders owe it to this institution to give the National Guard a mission, the resources and role for which it will continue to defend the values of democracy – economic and political freedom; respect for human dignity; and the peaceful relations with other nations. The Army National Guard through transformation will be a relevant force for the Army and the Nation for the twenty-first century.

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